In Defence of Civil Disobedience: Part Two

In my previous posting, I outlined the historical significance of civil disobedience, tracing the creation of the phrase from Thoreau, who turned an innocuous poll tax into a deeply personal articulation of one’s beliefs, to the present iteration of collective disobedience against government policy. Today’s posting will take these concepts a step further into the legal realm.

The definition of “civil disobedience’ as found in Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, suggests the act is a “non-violent” form of group protest. This definition conjures up a vision of peaceful sign-bearing protesters, shouting slogans, and holding hands in solidarity before dispersing for a musical interlude and barbecue. This peaceful concept of civil disobedience no longer seems to fit the bill as today’s more complicated issues require a much higher shock quotient to get the attention of the media and then ultimately the government. Hand in hand with this more virulent form of disobedience is the more intransigent reaction by the government: as crowds shout “hell no, we wont go,” the government lawyers are busily drafting court applications for injunctive relief.

Injunctions, as I thoroughly discussed in my previous posting on the Occupy Movement, are a favoured response by the government as, if successful, results in a court imposed order for the disobedience to stop and then turns the protest into legally recognized unlawful conduct. This can have enormous repercussions as an injunction can not only effectively shut down any future protests, but can also provide legal precedent on the ultimate issue at stake: the fundamental freedoms protected under s. 2 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms involving s.2 (b) freedom of expression rights, s. 2(c) freedom of peaceful assembly, and s. 2(d) freedom of association. As discussed in previous postings, the Charter is not absolute and the Courts try to balance societal rights with the individual freedoms found under section 2. As a result, although the Courts may find a violation of s. 2 rights by the government seeking an injunction, where societal harm or violence is caused, the Courts tend to find such injunctions a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society under s.1.

The government may also respond to civil disobedience through the criminal justice system. Typically, such response is reserved for the clearest examples of law breaking such as the destructive effects of a rioting crowd. In those cases, the law is most severe, imposing harsh sentences on those who destroy property and harm others under the flimsy disguise of a "cause".

Criminal contempt charges may also be laid when injunctions are not obeyed. This scenario is subtler as it does not involve harmful action but involves inaction: a failure to obey a law, which has been declared valid by the courts. The justice system deals with this form of disobedience slightly differently. Here again Charter violations may not provide a valid defence, but may be taken into account as a mitigating factor on sentence.

To raise a valid defence on a criminal charge arising out of civil disobedience is a challenge as any moral or ethical arguments for committing the prohibited acts do not change the essence of the crime committed. The best way to explain this is through the Robin Hood scenario. Robin Hood and his Merry Men stole from the rich to give to the poor. When we hear this story we usually give Robin the “thumbs up” for fighting against tyranny and greed. We also cheer as he takes the gold from evil King John, knowing that the good King Richard will absolve Robin of any guilt. But, in terms of criminal law, a bandit is a bandit no matter how you slice it. Although Robin Hood may have a valid moral argument for his actions and therefore an excellent motive for breaking the law, the law is clear: the guilt act and the guilty mind are present and therefore Robin Hood is guilty of highway robbery. He may receive a suspended sentence from a sympathetic court but he is still a convicted felon.

There is, however, a possible defence available. In Perka v. the Queen, the Supreme Court of Canada, when considering the common law defence of necessity, suggested such a defence may be a valid defence to acts of civil disobedience. In the necessity defence both the prohibited act or actus reus and the fault requirement or mens rea is complete. Therefore, all essential elements of the crime have been fulfilled and the defence merely excuses the blameworthy conduct.

Essentially, the accused acknowledges the wrongfulness of the action but in the circumstances the accused should not be punished for the crime. Excuses are typically limited to emergency situations wherein the accused had no choice but to break the law. As our criminal law punishes only those who choose to act criminally, an excuse can exonerate an accused of a crime. In the necessity scenario, the accused must choose between two evils.

However, such exoneration comes with a price: the defence of necessity is only accepted in certain, very limited circumstances. There are three elements to the necessity defence. Firstly, the accused must be facing imminent peril or danger. Secondly, there must be no reasonable legal alternative but for the accused to break the law. Thirdly, the harm inflicted by committing the crime must be proportional to the harm, which would have been caused if the accused followed the law and not committed the crime. As a result, necessity is rarely advanced and even rarely accepted as a valid defence. When it is accepted, the Court views the behaviour as a form of moral involuntariness.

How does the necessity defence work in practice where there are acts of civil disobedience? The best case examples are not from usually staid Canada, but in the protest fuelled United States. In the 1969 case of United States v. Moylan, the appellants were charged with the destruction of government records, records they seized from a government office and burned with napalm in protest of the Vietnam War. Counsel for the defence, the “radical lawyer” and activist William Kunstler, argued that the jury should have been instructed that they “had the power to acquit even if appellants were clearly guilty of the charged offenses.” This “right’ was based in moral arguments as the appellants were protesting a war “outrageous to their individual standards of humanity.” Furthermore, the war itself was illegal and therefore citizens had an obligation, in the name of justice, to break the law in order to enforce the law.

The United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit Judge Sobeloff, took a page from the Robin Hood myth and found no matter how sincere the appellants were in their actions, and no matter how strong their moral arguments were, they still committed crimes for which they must be accountable. In upholding the law Justice Sobeloff remarked:

To encourage individuals to make their own determinations as to which laws they will obey and which they will permit themselves as a matter of conscience to disobey is to invite chaos. No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the option of disregarding with impunity any law, which by his personal standard was judged morally untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, as appellants claim, but inevitably anarchic.

The best known case of a jury being invited by defence to eschew the law and decide a case on their own moral conscious, was in R. v. Morgentaler, when Morris Manning, Q.C. invited the jury to acquit Dr. Morgentaler of violating the "bad" abortion law. The Supreme Court of Canada chastised Manning for his emotional appeal, finding that such an invitation would “undermine and place at risk” the jury system. In support of this position, Chief Justice Dickson referred to the British 1784 criminal libel case of R. v. Shipley and quoted Lord Mansfield as follows:

So the jury who usurp the judicature of law, though they happen to be right, are themselves wrong, because they are right by chance only, and have not taken the constitutional way of deciding the question. It is the duty of the Judge, in all cases of general justice, to tell the jury how to do right, though they have it in their power to do wrong, which is a matter entirely between God and their own consciences.

To be free is to live under a government by law . . . . Miserable is the condition of individuals, dangerous is the condition of the State, if there is no certain law, or, which is the same thing, no certain administration of law, to protect individuals, or to guard the State.  ...

In opposition to this, what is contended for? -- That the law shall be, in every particular cause, what any twelve men, who shall happen to be the jury, shall be inclined to think; liable to no review, and subject to no control, under all the prejudices of the popular cry of the day, and under all the bias of interest in this town, where thousands, more or less, are concerned in the publication of newspapers, paragraphs, and pamphlets. Under such an administration of law, no man could tell, no counsel could advise, whether a paper was or was not punishable.

Certainly, it is valid to be fearful of a capricious jury who are guided by their own prejudices and sensibilities but there is an attraction to the ability of a jury to “do the right thing” and acquit in circumstances where the law is unjust, not just unfavourable, but unjust. When I was a student at Osgoode Law School in 1983, Morris Manning came to the school and reenacted his Morgnetaler jury address, an address which did result in an acquittal for the doctor. It was a moving piece of advocacy, which did stir the moral conscious. In the end, I was questioning the moral and legal basis for a law, which could send Dr. Morgentaler to jail. Ultimately the court system did work for Dr. Morgentaler, due to our Charter, the best defence against tyranny and injustice.

What does all of this mean for the ongoing student protests in Quebec? It is unclear where the Quebec government will go. Certainly the new laws they have introduced to stop further protest has only fueled more acts of civil disobedience. As with the occupy movement, these acts have gone viral and the issue has become one of students’ rights and the moral obligation to speak out against seemingly “bad” laws. However, to speak out against laws is much different than acting out criminally. It will ultimately be up to the Courts to draw the line between the two.

The Incivility of Civil Disobedience: Part One

Civil disobedience is a familiar phrase these days what with the Occupy movement occupying public space and now University students protesting higher tuition rates. The term “Civil Disobedience” was coined by American author, writer, poet, naturalist and all around polymath Henry David Thoreau as the title of an essay originally published in 1849 as "Resistance to Civil Government." At the time, Thoreau was the voice of a country struggling with itself, both politically and morally. His was a voice of reason but also one of deep moral principle. In 1846, Thoreau was arrested and imprisoned for a failure to pay his poll taxes. Poll taxes were levied on all eligible voters as a prerequisite of voting and were the main means of raising funds for local governments. The poll tax, which anti-slavery abolitionists like Thoreau refused to pay, was levied to fund the Mexican War in a bid to extend American slave territories. The amount of the tax, even at that time a paltry $1.50, was viewed by Thoreau as too high a moral price to pay. Although his Aunt, against his wishes, paid the fee and Thoreau was released after only one night in jail, his essay on the experience remains today the first in a line of many personal actions of civil disobedience. I say “personal” as there was already an American example of group disobedience in the form of the famous Boston Tea Party, an act of disobedience heard across the ocean by King George III and the British Parliament.

Martin Luther King Jr., in another example of personal disobedience to the law, would also pen a famous piece of prose in the Letter from the Birmingham Jail. In this acerbic response to his critics, King tackles head on the moral and ethical issue of obeying “just” and “unjust” laws. To support his actions, King refers to St. Augustine’s position that an “unjust law is no law at all.” He also uses as a stark analogy the ultimate “unjust” laws of Nazi Germany. The letter became a touchstone for the civil rights movement and the idea that morally “unjust” laws should not and could not be followed became a permanent fixture in the American psyche.

Unsurprisingly, in Canada, acts of civil disobedience have been most pronounced in Aboriginal rights issues such as in the Burnt Church conflict involving the traditional fishing rights of the Mikmaq nation of Atlantic Canada. Another high profile case of civil disobedience was the Ipperwash Crisis and the police shooting death of Native activist, Dudley George.  Of course, more recently, the Occupy Movement is another example of collective disobedience. Canadians even have a “how-to” book for such practices with the Protestors’ Guide to the Law of Civil Disobedience in British Columbia. This document is easily accessible on-line and is written by Leo McGrady Q.C., a well-known BC lawyer specializing, on the union/employee side, in labour relations. No surprise, as BC has seen more than its share of civil unrest relating to teacher labour issues. Read my previous blog on the Legal Politics of Seussville for more on the issue.

With this little history lesson, my next posting will deal with the legal aspects of civil disobedience. How have the Courts reacted to this issue? Is the Charter engaged when acts of civil disobedience are stopped? And finally, what kind of legal defences are available when such acts become subject to the criminal courts?

The Pridgen Case: A University Is Not A Charter-free Zone

As predicted, the Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the lower Court’s decision in the Pridgen case, agreeing the University’s Academic Council was unreasonable when they disciplined the Pridgen brothers for the less than polite remarks made about their University professor on their Facebook page. For details of the Alberta Queens Bench decision see my earlier posting of the issue here.

Although the result is not surprising, what is a disappointment is the lack of unanimity on the issue of the application of the Charter. Only Madame Justice Paperny tackled the issue of the Charter, the other two concurring Justices preferred to decide the issue on administrative law alone. Even so, Justice Paperny’s excellent analysis, should give the University some pause for thought as she emphasized the absurdity of the University’s position, which would make the University, a bastion of learning and free thought, a “Charter-free zone.” Clearly, the University’s reluctance to allow the Charter into the hallowed halls of learning irked Madame Paperny and so it should us all: a place that teaches the precepts of the Charter should be ruled by it.

In any event, the question of the Charter applying involves an argument over the breadth of the authority of the Charter. Under section 32 of the Charter, the statute governs the relationship between the government and the individual only and does not cover private relationships. Thus, the University, tried to distance itself from Charter requirements by characterizing the student/University relationship as a contractual one between two private parties. Of course, as pointed out by Justice Paperny, the University’s relationship with students is not a mere contractual one. Additionally, the University is far from a private institution as it receives government funds and fulfills government policy. Indeed, there would be no need for the Minister of Advanced Education if the government were not truly a partner in post-secondary education.

Once a determination is made that the Charter does apply, it then becomes difficult to suggest the Pridgen twins did not have a right to express themselves under s. 2(b) on the issue of professor performance or, shall we say, the lack of performance. Granted their comments were not “nice” but they fell well short of defamation and were in the realm of fair comment and fair complaint.

One wonders how the Pridgen scenario differs from the kind of student evaluations done under the auspices of the University. Feedback forms include an area for comments on the teacher. The only difference is the ability for the comments to be viewed by others who have access to the Facebook page. However, can that factor alone attract such harsh consequences? Thankfully, the Court of Appeal said “no” but unfortunately, the full court did not go the extra step and embrace the Charter, and the values for which the Charter stands, by finding the University is not a Charter-free zone.

The Cabbie and the Glider: A Tale of Two Bail Hearings

Two stories surfaced in Canadian legal news this week: the Montreal cab driver, charged after running down a man after he attacked his cab and the British Columbia hang glider operator charged after a woman he was flying with fell to her death.

The Montreal story went viral after a video was posted showing part of the altercation. It is shocking to see the cab driver bombarded by the mob but equally shocking to see his cab turn into the crowd and run down the victim. As heated as the incident was, the bail hearing appearance on May 2 was more so as an outraged group of cab drivers descended on the Montreal courthouse to lend support for the driver. The media picked up story after story from the crowd of cabbies, many of whom were immigrants, of humiliating and violent incidences of passenger misconduct involving racially motivated comments.

According to media reports, the 47 year-old cab driver of Haitian origins, Guercy Edmond, was released on a “promissory note”, with conditions, in the amount of $3,000.00. He was released on bail after a tongue lashing by Quebec Judge Jean-Pierre Boyer over the length of time the cabbie sat in custody (four days) and the crown attorney’s failure to review the video-tape, posted on YouTube of the altercation. He faces charges of aggravated assault under section 266 of the Criminal Code, assault with a weapon (presumably the cab) under s. 267, failing to stop at the scene of an accident under section 252, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm pursuant to s. 249(3).

By way of explanation, our criminal law system, based upon the English common law tradition, presumes an accused will be released from custody without conditions. This bail presumption is very much connected to our cherished presumption of innocence: upon arrest, the accused is presumed innocent until proven otherwise by the crown prosecutor in a court of law before an impartial and independent judiciary. The bail presumption is also consistent with our Charter rights: section 11(d), which constitutionally protects the presumption of innocence, section 11(e), which gives the accused the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause, and particularly the s. 7 right to liberty, which cannot be deprived except in accordance with our principles of fundamental justice. On this basis, the bail procedures in the Criminal Code require unconditional release. For example, section 515(1) of the Criminal Code states that:

Subject to this section, where an accused who is charged with an offence other than an offence listed in section 469 is taken before a justice, the justice shall, unless a plea of guilty by the accused is accepted, order, in respect of that offence, that the accused be released on his giving an undertaking without conditions…

Any decision contrary to this fundamental principle of release can only be done in very restrictive circumstances. However, there are exceptions to the general rule, where the presumption is not for release (also known as a “reverse onus” situation where the accused must “show cause” why detention in not required), for more serious offences such as murder (section 469 offences) or for those accused already on a prior form of release.

Consistent with our desire to protect the innocent, section 503 of the Criminal Code requires an accused, who is not released upon arrest, to be brought before a justice of the peace or provincial court judge for a bail hearing within 24 hours of arrest without unreasonable delay or as soon as practicable. In Alberta, due to a “promise” made by Ralph Klein when he was Premier, there are 24-hour bail hearings available. In any event, once brought before a judge, the Code does permit a bail hearing to be adjourned for a maximum of three days without the consent of the accused. Thus, Mr. Edmond, who was arrested on Sunday, April 29, appeared before a judge, within twenty-four hours of his arrest, on Monday, April 30. At that time, the hearing was adjourned within the three-day time limit, without requiring consent of the accused, to Wednesday, May 2.

In Mr. Edmond’s case, the crown was objecting to his release from custody. Our criminal law requires an accused to be released from custody unless there are cogent reasons not to release the accused. If, as in the case of Mr. Edmond, the Crown objects to release, the Crown must “show cause” or justify why the accused should not be released. In fact, even if the accused is released, the crown must also “show cause” why conditions to that release would be required.

There are three grounds for detention under s. 515 (10) of the Criminal Code. Section 515(10)(a) requires the justice to order detention where it is necessary in order to ensure the accused’s attendance in court. Section 5151(10)(b) requires a detention order where it is necessary for the “protection or safety of the public” including a substantial likelihood the accused would commit further offences or interfere with the administration of justice. The last ground deems detention is necessary to “maintain confidence in the administration of justice.” This last ground requires the justice to consider evidence relating to the strength of the crown’s case, the seriousness of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the offence, and the potential sentence to be imposed upon conviction.

On this basis, clearly, Mr. Edmond, who had no prior criminal record, enjoyed the support of his family and peers, was the financial support for his wife and two teenagers, and who allegedly committed the offences in extreme circumstances, would be an excellent candidate for release. In other words, the crown would be hard pressed to justify his detention. This is the reason why the judge was less than impressed with the prosecutor at the time of the bail hearing: there was no justifiable legal reason why the crown should not have consented to the release of Mr. Edmond. Although the police, in certain circumstances, also have the authority to release an accused from the police station, the charges laid against Mr. Edmond were serious enough to require his attendance before a judge. Mr. Edmond is to appear in court, to set a date for trial, on June 20.

Just a note here on the form of Mr. Edmond’s release. According to the media reports, Mr. Edmond was released on a “promissory note,” which is not one of the authorized forms of release under the Criminal Code. Again, due to the presumption in favour of release without conditions, the forms of release available run from the least restrictive to the most restrictive. The least restrictive form of release is known as an “undertaking,” with or without conditions. This release, also known as a Form 12 release, is a document signed by the accused wherein the accused “undertakes” to attend court on a particular date and time. If there are conditions, such as reporting to a police officer or remaining in a particular jurisdiction, they are listed on the signed form as well. The next form of release, more restrictive than an undertaking, is a recognizance. A recognizance requires the accused to acknowledge a debt to the Crown, which is forfeited if the accused fails to appear in court. The amount is specified in the document and may or may not require the amount to actually be deposited with the court. A recognizance may also require a surety, who is a third party willing to ensure the accused appears in court and follows any release conditions. A surety may also be required to acknowledge a debt to the crown, which may be forfeited if the accused breaches bail. Considering Mr. Edmond was released with a monetary amount ($3000) attached, most likely the form of release was a recognizance with no sureties and no deposit.

One of the conditions of Mr. Edmond’s release requires him to not pick up fares on St. Laurent Blvd. between Sherbrooke and St. Joseph Sts. between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m., which is within the same area in which the incident occurred. According to the evidence read into court, before the events before the video recorded the altercation, started in the cab after Edmond picked up “very drunk” passengers, one of who was the victim, Benoit Kapelli. While in the cab, Edmond was subjected to racially motivated comments and was assaulted by Kapelli, who ultimately left the cab while kicking at the vehicle. Edmond confronted Kapelli, but the other passengers joined in the attack of the cab. Edmond was able to drive away but was still tracking the passengers as they walked. At this point, the explanation for the events become vague as Edmond’s cab either deliberately or accidently swerved into a lamppost close to Kapelli, resulting in the cab’s front fender falling off. Later, as seen in the video, a pedestrian throws the bumper at the cab. Again, watch the video here to see the final moments of the incident.

The hang glider’s fate was not so certain as the Judge adjourned his bail hearing to Friday, May 4 in anticipation of gathering more evidence. The evidence, of course, is actually inside the accused, William Jonathon Orders, who swallowed the crucial memory card capturing a video of the fatal flight. As they say “this too will pass” and with the passing it is likely Mr. Orders will then be released on bail. Mr. Orders is charged with willfully attempting to obstruct the course of justice pursuant to s. 139 of the Code for his attempt to hide the evidence from police investigation. No doubt further charges, such as criminal negligence or even manslaughter, will ultimately be laid, when the physical swallowed evidence is finally retrieved.

The Legal Politics of Seussville

This past week, after a seemingly tight but really not so tight Alberta election, the idea of sitting down to a Dr. Seuss book seems, well, almost refreshing. Admittedly, my days of “The Cat In the Hat” are over and perhaps “You’re Only Old Once” is more my speed, but as this week has shown, there is more to Seuss than meets the eye. Certainly, school administrators’ in Prince Rupert, British Columbia deem Dr. Seuss too political to be used in the classroom. In an attempt to create public awareness over an ongoing labour dispute cut short by the B.C. government in Bill 22, the teachers in Prince Rupert have placed the following quote from Seuss’s Yertle the Turtle on T-shirts, signs, and bumper stickers: “I know, up on the top you are seeing great sights, but down here at the bottom we, too, should have rights.” School officials have warned the teachers not to display this quote on school property or in the classroom as such “political messaging” is deemed inappropriate for the classroom. School administrators base their position on previous arbitration decision, which found a teacher’s right to expression was limited by a student’s right to be insulated from political messages.

The April 5, 2012 decision of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board in British Columbia Teachers' Federation v British Columbia Public School Employers' Association tackled the ban on teachers in the Vancouver and Nanaimo school districts from wearing T-shirts and buttons with the following slogans: "Standing up for BC Students," "Proud to be a Teacher," "I (heart) Public Education" and "Kids matter. Teachers Care." The Board declined to rule on the issue, finding the matter, which was essentially one of freedom of expression, was properly an issue for the collective bargaining arbitrator. Of course, this ruling does not bode well for the teachers’ union based on previous rulings of the arbitrator such as in the February 2011 ruling in British Columbia School Employers Association, School district No. 73 v. British Columbia Teachers Federation. In that decision, the arbitrator found the teachers’ freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter was not violated when the teachers were required to remove black armbands worn by them in the classroom to protest the ongoing labour dispute. Although the employer admitted the removal violated freedom of expression rights under the Charter, the order to remove was justified under s.1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit. Invoking the Oakes test, the arbitrator found the limit was demonstrably justified based on the location of the protest in the classroom before elementary aged children. In support, the arbitrator relied on a comment made by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 2009 decision of Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component that “the likelihood of children being present matters” and that the teachers had ample opportunities, outside of the classroom, to engage in protest. It was, in the arbitrator’s view, reasonable to “insulate” school-aged children from the dispute, which touched directly on their education, during classroom hours.

Interestingly, the arbitrator’s decision was not based upon a previous British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in British Columbia Public School Employers' Association v. British Columbia Teachers' Federation, which recognized the School Boards mandate of “ensuring an open and supportive education environment.” In order to fulfill this mandate, the majority of the Court found, the Board was justified in requiring teachers to refrain from using political messaging in the schools, although the directive in question was overly broad and failed on the Oakes minimal impairment test.

Significantly, Madame Justice Huddart, writing for the majority decision, agreed teachers were not "silent members of society” and went further in stating:The School Boards cannot prevent teachers from expressing opinions just because they step onto school grounds. School grounds are public property where political expression must be valued and given its place… Therefore, in my opinion, the absolute ban of discussion on school property during school hours did not minimally impair teachers' rights. Few places would be more appropriate for a discussion of the need for resources for public schools than a parent-teacher interview dedicated to one child's education. The Supreme Court noted in Pepsi, "[f]ree expression in the labour context benefits not only individual workers and unions, but also society as a whole" (at para. 35). The same holds true for teachers. Their political expression benefits society as a whole even where the concerns arise out of a labour relations dispute.

This decision resonates with my earlier blog posting, Freedom of Expression In The Classroom, in which I discussed freedom of speech in the classroom, albeit not in relation to labour dispute messaging. In posting, I referred to the case of the school teacher Richard Morin, who was disciplined and his contract not renewed after he showed an emotionally charged documentary highly critical of the religious right connection to American politics. Morin took his right to express himself in the classroom to the Prince Edward Court of Appeal, the majority of which upheld not only the teacher’s right to stimulate educative discussion in the classroom by presenting differing viewpoints but also the students’ right:

in a democratic society to have access to free expression by their teachers - encouraging diversity, critical thinking, and vigorous debate ... students have a right to hear this expression and benefit from it...this right of students is fundamental to their being citizens in a truly democratic state and students of that states' educational system.

So whether or not Dr. Seuss has a place in teacher political expression in classroom may be a matter for the Supreme Court of Canada to decide. Until then, I am pulling out my copy of The Lorax, another example of the “Politics of Dr. Seuss” as a reminder that kids have opinions too.