Yet again, we have come to a section criminalizing misconduct relating to the military under section 62. Such behaviours amount to mutinous or treasonous actions, which we have already encountered in the previous podcast on s. 53 and inciting mutiny(the text version is here). The existence of such offences in the Codehighlight parallel military offences found in the National Defence Actand give us a sense of the hierarchical structure of military misconduct. It also suggests the parallel systems of justice we have in Canada involving the criminal justice system and the military disciplinary system. We can envision an assault occurring on a military base as sanctioned under the court martial regime but that same act could also be envisioned as part of our criminal justice system and just as easily could have been heard in a provincial courthouse.
In terms of the Criminal Code, there are many references to the armed forces, some overt and some not so easily observed. As previously mentioned, we have already discussed mutiny under s.53, as an offence impacting military discipline. We also already discussed s.52 on sabotage(see podcastand text version), treason offences under s.46(see podcastand text version) and s. 50 assisting enemy alien(see podcast and text version) as offences potentially affecting the security and welfare of our armed forces. We also touched on military duty and military orders under s. 32 of the Codeon the military’s authority to suppress riots (see text and podcast here).
Sections we have not encountered yet show the breadth and depth of the criminal law in military affairs. First, the Codedefines the “Canadian Forces” under s. 2as the armed forces “raised” by Canada but also defines “Her Majesty’s Forces,” again under s. 2, as “naval, army and air forces of Her Majesty” wherever “raised,” including the Canadian Forces. Some of the Code provisions act to protect not only Canadian forces but Commonwealth nations as well. We do find in the Codeoffences a wide variety of military related offences, from falsely posing as a military member (s. 419) to torture under s. 269.1.
At this point, we should pause to remember how military law fits within the criminal law rubric. I touched upon this issue much earlier in this podcast series under Episode 8discussing s. 5 of theCodeas a section indicating the independence of military law from the criminal law. The section, as discussed in that podcast, together with s. 130 of the National Defence Act, create parallel but separate modes of sanctioning a member of the military, be it through disciplinary action or criminal prosecution. Again, this previous blog/podcast outlines in a very summary fashion, the procedure. The blog posting also points out the weaknesses in the military system to adequately underline the repugnant nature of some military offences pertaining to acts of cruelty toward the civilians in foreign nations. These human rights violations go beyond military discipline and treaty compliance and enter the realm of the criminal law to such as extent that only prosecution under the Criminal Codeseems appropriate even though the military courts’ sanctioning ability does permit for criminal law like punishment.
Since the writing of that blog posting in 2013, the Supreme Court in R v Moriarity,  3 SCR 485, 2015 SCC 55 has further considered the issue of the use of military discipline under the National Defence Act, in that case, for criminal offences involving fraud. The arguments raised issue with the overbreadth of criminal-like crimes that can be sanctioned under the military system. The decision, written by an unanimous court under Justice Cromwell, found that ss. 130(1)(a) and 117(f) of the NDA, permitting such sanctioning, did not infringe s. 7 of the Charter. As noted by Justice Cromwell in paragraph 8 of the judgment, only murder, manslaughter, and child abduction offences are not incorporated under the military Code of Service Discipline, which provides the underlying authority for disciplining such misconduct. The decision also reiterates earlier case law (see the 1992 Généreuxdecision) that “Parliament’s objective in creating the military justice system was to provide processes that would assure the maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale of the military” (see para 46 of Moriarity). In order to fulfill these objectives the disciplinary process may sanction military offenders with these “criminal” offences.
Turning back to the issue at hand, s. 62 of the Codeis a broad section, overly broad I will suggest, outlining offences relating to military forces, some of which are reflective of other offences in the Code. This section applies to both Canadian Forces and those foreign armed forces present in Canada as provided for in the working definition of “member of a force” under s. 62(2).
Section 62(1) reads as follows:
62 (1) Every one who wilfully
(a) interferes with, impairs or influences the loyalty or discipline of a member of a force,
(b) publishes, edits, issues, circulates or distributes a writing that advises, counsels or urges insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty by a member of a force, or
(c) advises, counsels, urges or in any manner causes insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty by a member of a force,
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
This section seems to take all of the other offences in the Coderelating to military such as sections 46, 50, and 52 to 53 and provide an omnibus offence with aspects of treason (see s. 62(1)(a)), mutiny (see s. 62(1)9c), and sedition (see s. 62(1)(b) all bound into one section. However, this section appears to offer offences considerably less serious than the other criminal offences it seems to mimic considering the punishment differences. For instance, treason under s. 47 is an offence punishable by a maximum of fourteen years or life (see as previously mentioned podcast Episode 43). Section 62 involves criminal conduct similar to those more serious sections but sanctions the conduct as an indictable offence with a maximum of 5 years imprisonment.
Historically, it should be noted, the section was brought into the Codein the 1951 amendments and was initially a section involving “Miscellaneous offences of a seditious nature.” For a full discussion of sedition, see Episode 54of my podcast. Notably, however, section 62 does not exactly mirror the sedition section under s. 59 and permits a much broader unlawful act. Sedition under s. 59 criminalizes seditious words and intention as publishing, circulating or advocating. Section 62 criminalizes words of insubordination, disloyalty or mutiny, in the context of the armed forces, that are not only published and circulated but also distributed, issued, or edited. Although distributing and issuing may be synonyms for publishing and circulating, the act of editing is not. There are no other offences in the Codethat consider editing a document for a criminal purpose as a crime. The reference to interfering with loyalty or discipline is reminiscent of the mischief sections under s. 430. The prohibited act of “influences” is also found in the obstruct justice offences under s. 139and corruption like offences under ss. 123 and 121. Although “advises” and “counsels” are akin to the counselling section in the Codeunder s. 22, “urges,” as a prohibited act, is not found in any other section of the Code. This shows s. 62 to be an amalgam of offences providing for a broad range of misconduct.
The fault requirement can be found in the word “wilful,” which as mentioned in previous podcasts (Episode 44and Episode 45), indicates a requirement for subjective liability but depending on the interpretation of the word, may indicate a form of subjective liability requiring a high-level of intention. There is no case law on the issue.
In fact I found no cases directly on s. 62 in my database search. One possible reason is the desire to use the more flexible court martials process for such misconduct considering the approval for such usage in Moriarity. Furthermore, s. 11(f) of the Charter, giving the right to a jury trial for offences punishable by 5 years or more, specifically exempts military tribunal sanctions. Thus, making for a summary procedure under the military laws.
This brings us to my final comment on this section – a comment you who have listened to my podcasts may be already tired of hearing – that in the reform of the Code, the government should be pressed to review all of the military-like offences in the Codefor revision and/or deletion.