As most “legalistas” or those ardent followers of new case law know, it is the most recent Supreme Court of Canada cases involving contentious and pressing legal issues, which attract our attention. We eagerly stand by at the appointed time, smart phone in hand, for that exquisite moment when the screen is refreshed to reveal the release of that much anticipated decision. As soon as the style of cause hovers into existence, the rush to read with speed commences. The race begins as we calculate how long it will take to comment or tweet on the case. The quickest and most fluid response is an indication of which legalista can digest and synthesize often hundreds of paragraphs of newly minted precedent. Admittedly, I have been part of this crowd commenting. The excitement one feels in reading a new case and the energy created by extending the legal mind beyond known parameters is truly exhilarating.
Yet, there is a similar excitement in the quieter cases. In those legal morsels of information, it is fun to find a pattern or trend. This connection between seemingly disparate and non-descript cases provides a richness to legal analysis. For this blog commentary, I decided to side step for the time the newest and notable cases of R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 and R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33to look at another recent decision R v Omar, 2019 SCC 32. Omaris brief and easily discarded in favour of Le and Barton but when viewed in detail the case raises contentious and pressing issues worth discussing. Although Omar did not generate any buzz at the time of its release, it does ignite a worthy discussion on when the Supreme Court of Canada decides not to comment on an issue preferring to “leave” the “question for another day.”
The Omar decision is slim. It consists of 2 paragraphs worth of reasons amounting to 7 sentences. This is not unusual for a Bench decision given orally. It is written by Justice Brown, on behalf of a 7-person panel, who outlines both the majority and dissenting opinions even though Justice Brown himself is in the dissent. Assuming it is likely the readers of this blog commentary have not read the case, I will reproduce it in full as follows:
A majority of this Court would allow the appeal, substantially for the reasons of Brown J.A. at the Court of Appeal. The majority adds this. It may be that consideration should be given to the availability, under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of remedies other than exclusion of evidence when dealing with s. 24(2), but the majority would leave this question for another day.
Justices Karakatsanis, Brown and Martin dissent, substantially for the reasons of Sharpe J.A. at the Court of Appeal. The dissenters add this. It may be that consideration should be given to whether the police should caution persons that they stop and question that such persons need not remain or answer questions, but the dissenters would leave this for another day.
The appeal is allowed, and the convictions are restored.
There are a few notable comments to make on this brief scribe-like decision. I call it “scribe-like” as the tone of the decision brings to my mind the Ottoman Empire at its zenith when every military retinue included a Chief Scribe or Katib recording the events in a today’s version of live-streaming. This detached description of events leaves the reader with a lingering desire to hear more. Tantalizingly, the decision does “leaves” us with a desire to hear more about 2 significant issues. The majority “adds this”: a musing on whether s. 24(1) remedies can take the place of the s. 24(2) exclusionary response where there are multiple violations of the Charter involving sections 8,9, and 10(b). Still more intriguing is the dissent, who “leaves” us with “this”: the possibility of a SCC response to the habitual question left unresolved by case law of whether there is a positive duty on the police to advise a citizen that they need not remain and answer police questioning. As a criminal law professor who regularly teaches Moore v The Queen,  1 SCR 195, a decision relying on the engagement of reciprocal duties between questioning police and responding citizens,I would welcome the much-needed modern approach to this issue. These two “we will leave for another day” issues are in fact of such pressing interest that this leave taking seems almost disingenuous and disappointing.
But this approach to “leave for another day” is not exactly unheard of in the annals of SCC decisions. A quick perusal of Supreme Court cases uncovers 80 such decisions since 1980 in which the SCC has left us on the edge of our seat. Looking at the number of such cases rendered on a yearly basis, not since 1997 has the Court done so in so many cases in one year. In 1995, there are 7 leave-taking decisions and in 1997 there 5 cases. So far, in 2019, there are 5 such decisions and the year is only half way complete. Looking at the number of such decisions per decade, over the span of 1990s, there are 32 “leave to later” decisions, which equals almost half of the total. The next decade, that of the years starting in 2000 and ending in 2010, has provided only 10 decisions, while the present decade from 2011 on to the present day has released 24 such decisions.
What is the significance of this numeric counting? One could speculate that the divisiveness in the Court in the crucial period of the 1990s, where the Court rendered many split decisions, produced cases in which the Court left issues on the conference table in an effort to minimize the disagreements. The same can be said for 2019. Chief Justice Wagner has publicly announced his support for healthy dissenting positions. Perhaps this uptick in leaving matters for later is a result of this loosening of the consensus-driven decisions under former Chief Justice McLachlin. By deflecting some contentious matters to “later,” decisions can be rendered more readily on the core issues.
Yet, out of the 80 decisions, Omar stands alone as the only such decision rendered from the Bench. In a previous blog commentary, I wrote almost a year ago, entitled “Dispensing Speedy Justice”, I analyzed the increasing number of SCC decisions rendered in a summary fashion. It was my contention that the Court, in an effort to “walk the talk” from Jordan, is rendering more Bench decisions to move through the appellate backlog in an efficient manner. In doing so, the Court readily adopts lower appellate court decisions on the premise that if those reasons are well contrived then there is no reason for the Court to repeat or redo reasons. This position applies even in instances where the Court disagrees as many of these summary decisions involve dissenting positions.
Omar is a reflection of this position but then some. The case is brief, involves a majority and dissent which approves of the lower appellate court’s majority and dissent respectively. But Omar is unique as we experience a Court flexing their SCC muscle by raising issues of import in a Bench decision without deciding them. By doing so, the Court can keep the decision brief and timely. The Notice of Appeal in Omar was filed January 2, 2019 with the final decision released after argument was heard on May 22, 2019, less than 6 months later. Contrast this with R v Barton, which also includes issues left for “another day” (see para 182), which took 7 months between argument and decision. Or R v Le, also leaving issues for “another day” (see para 128), which took 15 months for the filing of the Notice of Appeal to decision.
In 2019 thus far, there are 12 criminal cases rendered orally from the Bench out of a total of 22 criminal decisions. With over half of the criminal appeals being treated in a summary fashion, it is no wonder that Omar takes this new form of decision-making even further. What this case suggests for the future is as thought-provoking as contemplating the newest cases such as Le and Barton. In the spirit of the SCC however, I will leave this discussion for another day.